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We give a mathematical definition for the notion of inconclusive quantum measurements.
In physics, such measurements occur at intermediate stages of a complex measurement
procedure, with the final measurement result being operationally testable. Since the
mathematical structure of Quantum Decision Theory (QDT) has been developed
in analogy with the theory of quantum measurements, the inconclusive quantum
measurements correspond, in QDT, to intermediate stages of decision making in
the process of taking decisions under uncertainty. The general form of the quantum
probability for a composite event is the sum of a utility factor, describing a rational
evaluation of the considered prospect, and of an attraction factor, characterizing
irrational, subconscious attitudes of the decision maker. Despite the involved irrationality,
the probability of prospects can be evaluated. This is equivalent to the possibility of
calculating quantum probabilities without specifying hidden variables. We formulate a
general way of evaluation, based on the use of non-informative priors. As an example,
we suggest the explanation of the decoy effect. Our quantitative predictions are in very
good agreement with experimental data.
Keywords: quantum measurements, decision theory, inconclusive events, quantum probability, non-informative
priors, decoy effect
1. INTRODUCTION
The standard theory of quantum measurements [1] is based on the projection operator
measure corresponding to operationally testable events. Simple measurements really have to
be operationally testable in order to possess physical meaning. However, if a measurement is
composite, consisting of several parts, the intermediate stages do not have to necessarily be
operationally testable, but can be inconclusive.
As a typical example, we can recall the known double-slit experiment, when particles pass
through a screen with two slits and then are registered by particle detectors some distance away
from the screen. This experiment can be treated as a composite event consisting of two parts, one
being the passage through one of the slits and second, registration by detectors. The registration of
a particle by a detector is an operationally testable event, since the particle is either detected or not,
with the result being evident for the observer. But the passage of the particle through one of the
slits is not directly observed, and the experimentalist does not know which of the slits the particle
has passed through. In that sense, the passage of the particle through a slit is an inconclusive event.
The existence of this inconclusive event, occurring at the intermediate stage of the experiment,
Yukalov and Sornette Inconclusive Quantum Measurements and Decisions under Uncertainty
is intimately associated with an interference effect. Otherwise, if
the experimentalist would precisely determine the slit through
which the particle has passed, the interference pattern registered
by the particle detectors would be destroyed. The existence of
interference is precisely due to the presence of the inconclusive
event that happened at the intermediate stage.
The occurrence of inconclusive events in decision making
is even more frequent and important. Practically any decision,
before it is explicitly formulated, passes through a stage of
deliberation and hesitation accompanying the choice. That is,
any decision is actually a composite event consisting of an
intermediate stage of deliberation and of the final stage of taking
a decision. The final stage of decision making is equivalent
to an operationally testable event in quantum measurements.
While the intermediate stage of deliberation is analogous to an
inconclusive event.
The analogy between the theory of quantum measurements
and decision theory has been mentioned by von Neumann
[1]. Following this analogy, Quantum Decision Theory (QDT)
has been advanced [2–7], with the mathematical structure that
is applicable to both decision making as well as to quantum
measurements. The generality of our framework, being equally
suitable for quantum measurements and decision making, is its
principal difference from all other attempts that employ quantum
techniques in psychological sciences. An extensive literature on
various quantummodels in psychology and cognitive science can
be found in the books [8–11] and review articles [12–15].
Any approach, applying quantum techniques to decision
theory, is naturally based on the notion of probability.
This is because quantum theory is intrinsically probabilistic.
Respectively, the intrinsically probabilistic nature of QDT is
what makes it principally different from stochastic decision
theory, where the choice is treated as always being deterministic,
while in the process of choosing the decision maker acts
with errors [16–20]. Such stochastic decision theories can be
termed as “deterministic theories embedded into an environment
with stochastic noise.” The standard way of using a stochastic
approach is to assume a probability distribution over the values
characterizing the errors made by the subjects in the process of
decision making. Then the parameters entering the distribution
are fitted to a posteriori empirical data by maximizing the log-
likelihood function. Such a procedure allows one to better fit
the given set of data to the assumed basic deterministic decision
theory, in particular due to the introduction of additional fitting
parameters. However, it does not essentially change the structure
of the underlying deterministic theory, although improving it
slightly. And, being descriptive, the classical stochastic approach
does not provide quantitative predictions.
Contrary to classical stochastic theory, in the quantum
approach, we do not assume that the choice of a decision maker
is deterministic, with just some weak disturbance by errors.
Following the general quantum interpretation, we consider
the choice process, including deliberations, hesitations, and
subconscious estimation of competing outcomes, as intrinsically
random. The probabilistic decision, in the quantum case, is not
just a stochastic decoration of a deterministic process, but it
is an unavoidable random part of any choice. The existence
of the hidden, often irrational subconscious feelings and
deliberations, results in the appearance of quantum interference
and entanglement. The difference between classical stochastic
decision theory and QDT is similar to the difference between
classical statistical physics and quantum theory. In the former,
all processes are assumed to be deterministic, with statistics
coming into play because of measurement uncertainties, such as
no precise knowledge of initial conditions and the impossibility
of measuring exactly the locations and velocities of all particles.
In contrast, quantum theory is principally probabilistic, which
becomes especially important for composite measurements.
A detailed mathematical theory of quantum measurements
in the case of composite events has been developed in our
previous papers [21–23]. In the present paper, we concentrate our
attention on composite measurements including intermediate
inconclusive events and on the application of this notion for
characterizing decision making under risk and uncertainty.
The importance of composite events, including intermediate
inconclusive events, in decision theory makes it necessary to pay
a special attention to the correct mathematical formulation of
such events and to the description of their properties allowing
for the quantitative evaluation of the corresponding quantum
probabilities. We show that, despite uncertainty accompanying
inconclusive events, it is possible to give quantitative evaluations
for quantum probabilities in decision theory, based on non-
informative priors. Considering, as an illustration, the decoy
effect, we demonstrate that even the simple non-informative
priors provide predictions in very good agreement with
experimental data.
2. COMPOSITE QUANTUM
MEASUREMENTS AND EVENTS
In this section, we give a brief summary of the general scheme
for defining quantum probabilities for composite events. As we
have stressed above, in our approach, themathematics is the same
for describing either quantummeasurements or decisionmaking.
Therefore, when referring to an event, we can keep inmind either
a fact of measurement or a decision action.
Let An be a conclusive operationally testable event labeled by
an index n. And let B = {Bα} be a set of inconclusive events
labeled by α. Defining the space of events as a Hilbert space H,
we associate with an event An a state |n〉 in this Hilbert space and
an event operator Pˆn,
An → |n〉 → Pˆn = |n〉〈n| . (1)
The event operator for an operationally testable event is a
projector.
The set of inconclusive events B generates in the Hilbert space
H the state |B〉 and the event operator PˆB,
B→ |B〉 → PˆB = |B〉〈B| , (2)
where the state reads
|B〉 =
∑
α
bα|α〉 , (3)
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with coefficients bα being random complex numbers. The event
operator for an inconclusive event is not necessarily a projector,
but a member of a positive operator-valued measure [7, 21–23].
The space of events, in the quantum approach, is the Hilbert
space
H = HA
⊗
HB (4)
that is a tensor product of the spaces
HA = span{|n〉} , HB = span{|α〉} .
Each decisionmaker is characterized by an operator ρˆ that can be
termed the strategic state of a decision maker, which, in quantum
theory, corresponds to a statistical operator. The pair {H, ρˆ}, in
physics, is named a statistical ensemble, and in decision theory, it
is a decision ensemble.
A composite event is called a prospect and is denoted as
πn = An
⊗
B . (5)
A prospect πn generates a state |πn〉 in the Hilbert space of events
H and a prospect operator Pˆ(πn),
πn → |πn〉 → Pˆ(πn) = |πn〉〈πn| , (6)
with the prospect state
|πn〉 = |n〉
⊗
|B〉 =
∑
α
bα|nα〉 . (7)
The prospect operator is a member of a positive operator-valued
measure, which implies that these operators satisfy the resolution
of unity [21, 23]. Since they contain random quantities bα , the
corresponding random resolution has to be understood not as
a direct equality between numbers, but, e.g., as the equality in
mean [24].
The prospect probability is
p(πn) = Tr ρˆPˆ(πn) , (8)
with the trace over the space H. To form a probability measure,
the prospect probabilities are to be normalized:
∑
n
p(πn) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(πn) ≤ 1 . (9)
Taking explicitly the trace in expression (Equation 8) and
separating diagonal and off-diagonal terms, we see that the
prospect probability
p(πn) = f (πn)+ q(πn) (10)
is represented as a sum of a positive-definite term
f (πn) =
∑
α
|bα|
2〈nα|ρˆ|nα〉 (11)
and a sign-undefined term
q(πn) =
∑
α 6=β
b∗αbα〈nα|ρˆ|nβ〉 . (12)
The appearance of the sign-undefined term is a purely quantum
effect responsible, in quantum measurements, for interference
patterns. The attenuation of this quantum term is called
decoherence. In quantum theory, decoherence can be due to
external as well as to internal perturbations and the influence of
measurements [25–27]. And in QDT, decoherence can occur due
to the accumulation of information [28].
The disappearance of the quantum term implies the transition
to classical theory. This is formulated as the quantum-classical
correspondence principle [29], which in our case reads as
p(πn)→ f (πn) , q(πn)→ 0 . (13)
This principle tells us that the term f (πn) plays the role of classical
probability, hence is to be normalized:
∑
n
f (πn) = 1 , 0 ≤ f (πn) ≤ 1 . (14)
When decisions concern a choice between lotteries, the classical
term f (πn) has to be defined according to classical decision theory
based either on expected utility theory or on some non-expected
value functional. This suggests to call f (πn) a utility factor, since
it is defined on rational grounds and reflects the utility of a
choice. The quantum term is caused by the interference and
entanglement effects in quantum theory, which correspond, in
decisionmaking, to irrational effects describing the attractiveness
of choice. Therefore, it can be called the attraction factor. From
Equations (9) and (14), it follows the alternation law
∑
n
q(πn) = 0 , −1 ≤ q(πn) ≤ 1 . (15)
Note that, in quantum theory, the definition of the composite
event in the form of prospect (Equation 5) is valid for any
type of operators, since they are defined on different spaces.
No problem with non-commutativity of operators defined on
a common Hilbert space arises. This way makes it possible to
introduce joint quantum probabilities for several measurements
[21, 23]. Contrary to this, considering operators on the same
Hilbert space does not allow one to define joint probabilities
for non-commuting operators. Sometimes, one treats the Lüders
probability of consecutive measurements as a conditional
probability. This, however, is not justified from the theoretical
point of view [21, 23, 30] and also contradicts experimental data
[31, 32]. But defining the quantum joint probability according to
expression (Equation 8) contains no contradictions.
In the present section, the general scheme of QDT is
presented. Being limited by the length of this paper, we cannot
go into all mathematical details that have been thoroughly
described in our previous publications. However, we would
like to stress that for the purpose of practical applications, it
is not necessary to study all these mathematical peculiarities,
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but it is sufficient to employ the final formulas following the
prescribed rules. One can use the formulated rules as given
prescriptions, without studying their justification. The main
formulas of this section, which are necessary for the following
application, are: the form of the quantum probability (Equation
10), the normalization conditions (Equations 9 and 14), and the
alternation law (Equation 15). More details required for practical
application will be given in the sections below.
3. NON-INFORMATIVE PRIOR FOR UTILITY
FACTORS
To make the above scheme applicable to decision theory, it is
necessary to specify how one should quantify the values of the
utility factors and attraction factors. Here we show how these
values can be defined as non-informative priors.
Let us consider a set of lotteries Ln = {xi, pn(xi) : i =
1, 2, . . . ,Nn}, enumerated by the index n = 1, 2, . . . ,NL, with
payoffs xi and their probabilities pn(xi). The related expected
utilities U(Ln) =
∑
i u(xi)pn(xi) can be defined according to the
expected utility theory [33]. For the present consideration, the
utility functions u(x) do not need to be specified. For instance,
they can be taken as linear functions, since this choice has the
advantage of making the utility factors independent from the
units measuring the payoffs.
In QDT, the act of choosing a lottery Ln, denoted as An,
together with the accompanying set of inconclusive events B,
including the decision-maker hesitations [6, 30], compose the
prospect (Equation 5). Depending on whether the expected
utilities are positive on negative, there can be two cases.
If the expected utilities of the considered set of lotteries are all
positive (non-negative), such that
U(Ln) ≥ 0 (n = 1, 2, . . . ,NL) , (16)
then it is reasonable to require that zero utility corresponds to
zero utility factor:
f (πn)→ 0 , U(Ln)→ 0 . (17)
The case where the utility factor is simply proportional to the
related expected utility trivially obeys this condition (Equation
17). Taking into account the normalization condition (Equation
14) gives the utility factor
f (πn) =
U(Ln)∑
n U(Ln)
. (18)
When the expected utilities are negative, which happens in the
domain of losses, such that
U(Ln) < 0 (n = 1, 2, . . . ,NL) , (19)
the required condition is that an infinite loss corresponds to zero
utility factor:
f (πn)→ 0 , |U(Ln)| → ∞ . (20)
The simplest way to satisfy this condition (Equation 20) is that
the utility factor is inversely proportional to the related expected
utility. Taking into account the normalization condition, we get
f (πn) =
|U(Ln)|
−1∑
n |U(Ln)|
−1
. (21)
The utility-factor forms (Equations 18 and 21) coincide with the
choice probabilities in the Luce choice axiom [34]. It is possible
to show that generalized forms for the utility factors can be
derived by maximizing a conditional Shannon entropy or from
the principle of minimal information [12, 35, 36].
In the case of positive expected utilities, we consider the
information functional, taking into account the normalization
condition (Equation 14) and the expected log-likelihood 3. This
functional reads as
I[ f (πn) ] =
∑
n
f (πn) ln f (πn) + λ
[∑
n
f (πn)− 1
]
+ α
[∑
n
f (πn)3(πn)−3
]
, (22)
where
3(πn) = − lnU(Ln) , U(Ln) ≥ 0 .
Minimizing functional (Equation 22) results in the utility factor
f (πn) =
Uα(Ln)∑
n U
α(Ln)
(α > 0) , (23)
in which the positive sign of α is prescribed by the condition that
the larger utility implies the larger factor.
In the case of negative expected utilities, the information
functional takes the form
I[ f (πn) ] =
∑
n
f (πn) ln f (πn) + λ
[∑
n
f (πn)− 1
]
+ γ
[
3−
∑
n
f (πn)3(πn)
]
, (24)
where
3(πn) = − ln |U(Ln)| , U(Ln) < 0 .
Then its minimization yields the utility factor
f (πn) =
|U(Ln)|
−γ∑
n |U(Ln)|
−γ
(γ > 0) , (25)
with the positive sign of γ prescribed by the requirement that the
larger cost implies the smaller factor.
The utility factors (Equations 23 and 25) are the examples
of power-law distributions that are known in many applications
[35–37].
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4. NON-INFORMATIVE PRIOR FOR
ATTRACTION FACTORS
Although the attraction factor characterizes irrational features
of decision making, it can be estimated by invoking non-
informative prior assumptions. An important consequence of the
latter is the quarter law derived earlier [4, 5, 12]. Here we first
give the new, probably the simplest, derivation of the quarter law
and, second, we show how this law can be used for estimating the
attraction factors in the case of an arbitrary number of prospects.
Let us consider the sum
1
NL
NL∑
n=1
|q(πn)| =
∫ 1
0
ϕ(x)x dx (26)
of the attraction factor moduli, where
ϕ(x) ≡
1
NL
NL∑
n=1
[ δ(x− q(πn))+ δ(x+ q(πn)) ] (27)
plays the role of the attraction-factor distribution. The latter is
normalized as ∫ 1
−1
ϕ(x) dx = 1 , (28)
since the attraction factors, in view of condition (Equation 15),
vary in the interval [−1, 1]. If q(πn) does not equal zero, then
normalization (Equation 28) is evident. And when q(πn) = 0,
then one should use the identity
∫ 1
0
δ(x) dx =
1
2
for the semi-integral of the Dirac function.
The use of a non-informative prior implies that the values of
the attraction factor are not known. A full ignorance is captured
by a uniform distribution, which, according to normalization
(Equation 28), gives
ϕ(x) =
1
2
. (29)
In that case, integral (Equation 26) results in the quarter law
1
NL
NL∑
n=1
|q(πn)| =
1
4
. (30)
If the prospect lattice L = {πn} consists of NL prospects, we
can always arrange the corresponding attraction factors in the
ascending order, such that
q(πn) > q(πn+1) (n = 1, 2, . . . ,NL − 1) . (31)
We denote the largest attraction factor as
qmax ≡ q(π1) > 0 . (32)
Given the unknown values of the attraction factors, the non-
informative prior assumes that they are uniformly distributed
and at the same time they must obey the ordering constraint
(Equation 31). Then, the joint cumulative distribution of the
attraction factors is given by
Pr[q(π1) < η1, q(π2) < η2, ..., q(πNL ) < ηNL |η1 ≤ η2 ≤ ...
≤ ηNL ] =
∫ η1
0
dx1
∫ η2
x1
dx2....
∫ ηNL
xNL−1
dxNL , (33)
where the series η1 ≤ η2 ≤ ... ≤ ηNL of inequalities ensure
the ordering. It is then straightforward to show that the average
values of the q(πn) are equidistant, i.e., the difference between any
two neighboring factors is on average
1 ≡ 〈q(πn)〉−〈q(πn+1)〉 = const (independent of n) . (34)
Taking their average values as determining their typical values,
we omit the symbol 〈.〉 representing the average operator and use
Equation (34) to represent the n-th attraction factor as
q(πn) = qmax − (n− 1)1 . (35)
With notations (Equations 32 and 34), the alternation condition
(Equation 15) yields
qmax =
NL − 1
2
1 . (36)
And the quarter law (Equation 30) leads to the gap
1 =
NL
2
∑
n |NL + 1− 2n|
. (37)
If NL is even, then
NL∑
n=1
|NL + 1− 2n| =
N2L
2
(NL even) ,
while when NL is odd, then
NL∑
n=1
|NL + 1− 2n| =
N2L − 1
2
(NL odd) .
This allows us to represent gap (Equation 37) as
1 =


1
NL
(NL even)
NL
N2L−1
(NL odd) .
(38)
And for the largest attraction factor, we find
qmax =


NL−1
2NL
(NL even)
NL
2(NL+1)
(NL odd) .
(39)
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The above expressions make it possible to evaluate, on the basis
of the non-informative prior, the whole set
QNL ≡ {q(πn) : n = 1, 2, . . . ,NL} (40)
of the attraction factors:
q(πn) =


1
2NL
(NL − 2n+ 1) (NL even)
NL
2(N2L−1)
(NL − 2n+ 1) (NL odd) .
(41)
For example, in the case of two prospects, we have
1 =
1
2
, qmax =
1
4
(NL = 2) ,
which yields the attraction set
Q2 =
{
1
4
, −
1
4
}
.
For three prospects, we get
1 =
3
8
, qmax =
3
8
(NL = 3) ,
hence
Q3 =
{
3
8
, 0 , −
3
8
}
.
Similarly, for four prospects, we find
1 =
1
4
, qmax =
3
8
(NL = 4) ,
with the attraction set
Q4 =
{
3
8
,
1
8
, −
1
8
, −
3
8
}
.
When there are five prospects, then
1 =
5
24
, qmax =
5
12
(NL = 5) ,
from where
Q5 =
{
5
12
,
5
24
, 0 , −
5
24
, −
5
12
}
.
Thus, we can evaluate the attraction factors for any number of
prospects, obtaining a kind of a quantized attraction set. In the
case of an asymptotically large number NL of prospects, we have
1 ≃
1
NL
, qmax ≃
1
2
(NL ≫ 1) , (42)
and
q(πn) ≃
1
2
−
2n− 1
2NL
. (43)
The non-informative priors can be employed for predicting
the results of decision making. This makes the principal
difference compared with the introduction into expected utility
of adjustment parameters that are fitted post-hoc to the given
experimental data [38].
5. QUANTITATIVE EXPLANATION OF
DECOY EFFECT
We now show how the non-informative priors of the attraction
factors can be employed to explain the decoy effect and for
quantitative prediction in decision-making. Throughout this
section, we denote, for simplicity, the objects of choice, say A,
as well as the act of choosing an object A, by the same letter A. As
has been emphasized above, the act of choice under uncertainty
is a composite prospect. But, again for simplicity, we employ the
same letter for denoting the action A and the related prospect
(Equation 5).
The decoy effect was first studied by Huber et al. [39], who
called it the effect of asymmetrically dominated alternatives. Later
this effect has been confirmed in a number of experimental
investigations [40–43]. The meaning of the decoy effect can be
illustrated by the following example. Suppose a buyer is choosing
between two objects,A and B. The objectA is of better quality, but
of higher price, while the object B is of slightly lower quality, while
less expensive. As far as the functional properties of both objects
are not drastically different, but B is cheaper, the majority of
buyers value the object B higher. At this moment, the salesperson
mentions that there is a third object C, which is of about the
same quality as A, but of a much higher price than A. This causes
the buyer to reconsider the choice between the objects A and
B, while the object C, having the same quality as A but being
much more expensive, is of no interest. Choosing now between A
and B, the majority of buyers prefer the higher quality but more
expensive object A. The object C, being not a choice alternative,
plays the role of a decoy. Experimental studies confirmed the
decoy effect for a variety of objects: cars, microwave ovens,
shoes, computers, bicycles, beer, apartments, mouthwash, etc.
The same decoy effect also exists in the choice of human mates
distinguished by attractiveness and sense of humor [44]. It is
common as well for animals, for instance, in the choice of female
frogs of males with different attraction calls characterized either
by low-frequency and longer duration or by faster call rates
[45].
The decoy effect contradicts the regularity axiom in decision
making telling that if B is preferred to A in the absence of C, then
this preference has to remain in the presence of C.
In the frame of QDT, the decoy effect is explained as follows.
Assume buyers consider an object A, which is of higher quality
but more expensive, and an object B, which is of moderate quality
but cheaper. Suppose the buyers have evaluated these objects A
and B, which implies that the initial values of the objects are
described by the utility factors f (A) and f (B). In experiments, the
latter correspond to the fractions of buyers evaluating higher the
related object. When the decoy C, of high quality but essentially
more expensive, is presented, it attracts the attention of buyers to
the quality characteristic. The role of the decoy is well understood
as attracting the attention of buyers to a particular feature of
the considered objects, because of which the decoy effect is
sometimes named the attraction effect [40]. In the present case,
the decoy attracts the buyer attention to quality. The attraction,
induced by the decoy, is described by the attraction factors
q(A) and q(B). Hence the probabilities of the related choices
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are now
p(A) = f (A)+ q(A) , p(B) = f (B)+ q(B) .
Since the quality feature becomes more attractive, q(A) > q(B).
According to the non-informative prior, we can estimate the
attraction factors as q(A) = 1/4 and q(B) = −1/4.
To be more precise, let us take numerical values from the
experiment of Ariely and Wallsten [43], where the objects under
sale are microwave ovens. The evaluation without a decoy results
in f (A) = 0.4 and f (B) = 0.6. In the presence of the decoy, we
predict that the choice probabilities can be evaluated as
p(A) = f (A)+ 0.25 , p(B) = f (B)− 0.25 .
This gives p(A) = 0.65 and p(B) = 0.35. The experimental values
for the choice between A and B, in the presence of but excluding
C, correspond to the fractions pexp(A) = 0.61 and pexp(B) = 0.39,
which is close to the predicted probabilities.
Another example can be taken from the studies of the frog
mate choice [45], where frog males have attraction calls differing
in either low-frequency sound or call rate. The males with lower
frequency calls are denoted as A, while those with high call rate,
as B. In an experiment with 80 frog females, without a decoy, it
was found that females evaluate higher the fastest call rate, so that
f (A) = 0.35 and f (B) = 0.65. In the presence of an inferior
decoy, attracting attention to the low-frequency characteristic,
the non-informative prior predicts the probabilities
p(A) = 0.35+ 0.25 = 0.6 , p(B) = 0.65− 0.25 = 0.4 .
The empirically observed fractions are found to be pexp(A) =
0.6 and pexp(B) = 0.4, in remarquable agreement with our
predictions.
To make it clear how the decoy effect fits the title of
the paper “Inconclusive quantum measurements and decisions
under uncertainty,” it is worth extending the comments that have
been mentioned in the Introduction.
Our principal point of view is that decision making, generally,
almost always deals with composite events, since any choice
is accompanied by subconscious feelings and irrational biases.
The latter are often difficult to formalize and, even more, their
weights usually are not known and are practically unmeasurable.
This is why these subconscious irrational factors can be treated
as what is called inconclusive events. When choosing between
several possibilities, say An, one actually considers composite
prospects, as defined in Equation (5). And the composite nature
of choices requires the use of quantum techniques, as has been
explained in our previous paper [30]. Otherwise, the probabilities
of simple events could be characterized by classical theory. It is
the composite nature of the considered prospects that yields the
appearance of the quantum term q(πn) related to interference
and coherence effects. In that way, the choice between the objects
in the decoy effect is also a composite prospect, being composed
of the choice as such and accompanying subconscious feelings
forming an inconclusive set. This is why the use of QDT here is
necessary and why it gives so good results.
It is admissible to give a schematic picture of the choice in
the decoy effect by analogy with the double-slit experiment in
physics, which is mentioned in the Introduction. Thus, making
a concrete selection of either an object A or B is the analog of
the registration of the particle by a detector. But before such a
selection is done, there exists the uncertainty of deciding which
of the object features are actually more important. These not
precisely defined acts of hesitation play the role of the slits,
with the uncertainty associated with which of them the particle
has passed through. When it is known which of the slits the
particle has passed through, then the interference effects in
physics disappear. Similarly, in decision theory, if the values
of each object are clearly defined, there are no hesitations, no
interference, and the selection can be based on classical rules.
Such an objective evaluation in the decoy effect happens in the
absence of any decoy, when a decision maker rationally evaluates
the features of the given objects, say quality and price. The
appearance of a decoy induces hesitations concerning which of
the features are actually more important. These hesitations before
the choice are the analogs of the uncertainty of which slits will
be visited by the traveling particle. The uncertainty results in
the interference and the arising quantum term, whether in the
registration of a particle or in the final choice of a decision maker.
6. DISCUSSION
We have presented a mathematical formulation for the concept
of inconclusive quantum measurements and events. This type
of measurements in physics happens at intermediate stages of
composite measuring procedures, while the final measurement
stage is operationally testable. In decision making, inconclusive
events correspond to the intermediate stage of deliberations.
Invoking non-informative priors, it is possible to estimate the
prospect probabilities, thus, predicting the results of decision
making.
Generally, invokingmore information on the properties of the
attraction factor, it is possible to define its form more accurately
than the value given by non-informative prior. For example, from
condition (Equation 9) it follows that
−f (πn) ≤ q(πn) ≤ 1− f (πn) .
Hence, for a positive q(πn), we have
0 ≤ q(πn) ≤ 1− f (πn) .
While for a negative q(πn), we get
−f (πn) ≤ q(πn) ≤ 0 .
Therefore, the attraction factor has to satisfy the limits
q(πn)→+0 , f (πn)→ 1 ,
q(πn)→−0 , f (πn)→ 0 .
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This suggests that the absolute value of the attraction factor can
be modeled by an expression proportional to
q(πn) ∝ f
µ(πn)[1− f (πn)]
ν ,
with µ and ν being positive parameters and the sign defined by
the ambiguity and risk aversion principle [4–6, 12]. More detailed
study of such a form will be given in a separate paper.
But it turns out that even the simple non-informative prior
provides us a rather good estimate allowing for quantitative
predictions in decision making. And we have illustrated the
approach by the decoy effect for which the non-informative
priors yield quantitative predictions in very good agreement with
empirical data.
In this paper, decision making by separate subjects is
considered. We think that the theory can be generalized by
considering societies of decision makers. The exchange of
information in a society should certainly influence the decisions
of the society members. To develop a theory of many agents, it
is necessary to generalize the apporach by treating a dynamical
model of agents exchanging information. Then, we think, it
would be feasible to describe the behavior of the agents operating
in a financial market and taking decisions about buying or
selling shares in the presence of information asymmetry. And it
would be possible to explain the known stylized facts in financial
markets, such as, for example, the fat tails of return distributions,
and volatility clustering, as well as transient bubbles and crashes,
which are connected with herding behavior. Some first results in
that direction are reported in our previous papers [6, 28], where
the role of additional information, received by decision makers,
is analyzed and it is shown that the amount of the additional
information essentially influences the value of the quantum term.
Further work on the generalization of the approach toward a
dynamical theory of decision-maker societies is in progress.
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